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NONSUPPORT ACTIONS AND THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCE-
MENT SUPPORT ACTt
The increasing mobility of our population,
coupled with a growing tendency to disregard
familial obligations, has created a new impetus
for a so ution to an old problem-forcing a
breadwinner to support his or her legal de-
pendents. The present problem of family
desertion has reached unprecedented levels
with staggering costs to the community. In
June, 1953, approximately 564,308 families
were receiving some 8605,096,000 per year in
public assistance throughout the United States.,
These statistics portray not only a social
maladjustment but also the failure of legal
techniques to solve the problems created by .
system of multiple state sovereignties. Interstate
desertion is an aggravated example of the
failure of the concepts of personal jurisdiction,
full faith and credit, comity and reciprocity to
resolve the problem of mobility beyond political
boundaries.
If the deserter has not yet acquired legal
domicil at his new location, the dependent
may, apart from remedies available under the
new reciprocal acts to be discussed later,
petition the home forum to exercise its personal
t Portions of this comment are reprinted from
Comment, The New Uniform Support of Dependents
Act, 45 ILL. L. REv. 252 (1950).
1 BOOK OF THE STATES 312 (1954-55). Compare
the figures for 1948, when approximately 223,000
families were receiving some $178.000.000 per year
in public assistance throughout the United States.
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF
PUBLIC AssisTA,:cE UJune. 19481.
jurisdiction over the defendant based on
domicil.2 But even if the basis for personal
jurisdiction is valid, the court is powerless to
enforce its order against an absentee party.
Taking this order to the state where the
deserter can be found, the petitioner will find
it entitled to full faith and credit only on
past accrued amounts not subject to modifica-
tion.3 Full faith and credit does not offer any
supervisory assurance of future payments,
without which there is nothing to restrain
a man who has already demonstrated his
disposition to walk out on his legal obligations
2Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1943). GoonRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 428
(3d ed. 1949). In addition to judicially declared
safeguards relative to the subjecting of a state's
own domiciliary to personal jurisdiction upon
reasonable notice served outside the boundaries of
the state, a number of states have procedural pro-
visions which permit such a course of action. See,
e.g., AMENDED ILL. CIV. PRACTICE ACT §§ 16, 17
(1956). For an opinion sustaining the constitu-
tionality of a similar provision, see, Allen v. Superior
Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P. 2d 905 (1953). A recent
commentary on the Illinois Act as amended, cites
sections 16 and 17, dealing with personal service on
domiciliaries without the state, as being likely to
cut relief roles. Chicago Daily Tribune, Aug. 8,
1955, p. 12, cot. 3.
3 Sistaire v. Sistaire, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v.
Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Barber v. Barber, 62
How. 582 (U.S. 1858); cf. Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAws 428 (3d ed. 1949).
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from doing so again. An alternative to proceed-
ing on a prior judgment is available in the
criminal indictment for failure to support
followed by a request for extradition of the
deserter to the home state of the dependent
entitled to support. 4 However, in addition to
being a costly burden upon the home state,
even if accomplished, extradition might well
uproot the deserter from a source of income in
the asylum state, and result either in his
imprisonment or his return to an environment
from which he has already indicated a deter-
mination to escape. Any practical prospects
of immediate support for dependents may be
so negligible as to dissuade the home state
from initiating extradition procedures at all.
Furthermore, the deserter may have incurred
additional obligations of support in the asylum
state by reason of a second marriage in which
case the authorities in that state might be
hard put in making the decision of whether or
not to honor the request for extradition. 6
Two alternatives, also apart from the recent
'Extradition for desertion is facilitated by the
Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act in 21
states. 10 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1954). In addition,
extradition may be possible under the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, in force in 40 states.
9 U.L.A. 376 (Supp. 1954). THE UNIFORM Ra-
CIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AcT, as
amended (1952), §§ 5 and 6, provides for "Criminal
Enforcement" of support duties designed to supple-
ment the Civil Enforcement procedures available
under the Act as a whole. See text at note 50,
infra.
Comment, The Uniform Enforcement of Support
Act in Massachusetts, 33 B.U.L. REv. 217 at 218
(1953). "The solution to the problem [of support of
dependents] via criminal enforcement runs into a
paradox; viz., the punishment, which the runaway
husband often merits, greatly intensifies the evil
which it is intended to alleviate." Id. at 219.
6 Although in the normal course of events the
governor of the responding state will honor a re-
quest for extradition without examining the merits
of any defense to the criminal indictment sworn out
in the initiating state, it is not inconceivable that
the governor of the responding state may refuse to
surrender a citizen of his state for failure to support
dependents in another state if the net result of his
action will be to add two or three persons to his own
relief rolls.
legislation, present possible solutions to the
problem. There is hope that the deserter may
be found in one ol a minority of states which
lend continuing equity supervision to the
enforcement of foreign support decrees.- Or,
the deserter may be located in one of the seven
states which have enacted the Uniform En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments Act, in
which case a prior judgment may be registered
and enforced. Despite their apparent broad-
ness, remedies previously used for the dilemma
of interstate desertion have proved to be woe-
fully inadequate, thus necessitating an en-
lightened approach by the states.
Confronted with this pressing social problem,
fifty-two jurisdictions have, within the past
7 A growing number of states are now, for reasons
based on comity and public policy, meeting the
national problem of deserted dependents through
equitable enforcement of alimony decrees and
support orders. See. e.g., Cummings v. Cummings.
97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929) (ordering
payment of weekly sums as they would thereafter
come due under New York decree); German v.
German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 At. 429 (1936) (en-
forcing equitably a New York decree even without
local statutory authority); Rube v. Rube, 313 I11.
App. 108, 39 N.E. 2d 379 (1942 (ordering de-
fendant to continue weekly payments on a Nevada
decree with assurance that Illinois would recognize
any subsequent modification); Ostrander v. Os-
trander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934)
(applying local statute granting equitable remedies
for the enforcement of local alimony and support
orders to a South Dakota alimony and support
order); Shibley v. Shiblev, 181 Wash. 166, 42 P.2d
446 (1935) (equitably enforcing of a California
decree on the basis of comity). See Scoles, En-
forcemient of Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony and
Support Orders, 53 COLt'M. L. RFv. 817 (1953);
Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgmenls in
.lnglo-American Law. 33 Micn. L. RFV. 1129.
1165 (1935).
1 Arkansas. Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin and Wyoming had passed the
UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JLDGMENTS
AcT as of Dec. 1, 1954. 9 U.L.A. 376 (Supp. 1954).
9 As of Sept. 1, 1955 all 48 states, Alaska, Hawaii.
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had enacted
some form of reciprocal legislation pertaining to the
interstate enforcement of support duties. The
District of Columbia had not as yet passed any
reciprocal legislation.
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seven years, enacted imaginative and en-
lightened- reciprocal enforcement of support
acts.' 0 Schematically the reciprocal acts pro-
vide a procedural device intended primarily
to- supplement pre-existing remedies under the
common or statutory law of the enacting
state." They present, for the enforcement of
support duties, an additional remedy not
intended to abrogate or affect in any way
.0 There are two basic acts in force throughout
th United States. The earliest act is the UNiFoRM
SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAw (hereafter cited as
USDL, originally enacted in New York in 1948
and -presently in force in Georgia, Illinois, Iowa.
New York and the Virgin Islands. In 1950 the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the UNIFORm RECIPROCAL
ENFORcEMENT AcT (hereafter cited as URES)
which was later amended in 1952 (URESA). In
December,. 1954, twelve jurisdictions still had in
force the original Act while thirty-three jurisdic-
tions had adopted the amended version, Nevada
enacting the amended Act in March, 1955. All
citatibns to section numbers will refer to URESA,
which" may be found in 9A U.L.A. 58 et.seq. (Supp.
1954).
11 Considerable confusion is engendered by the
question of whether or not sections 2(6), 4 and 7
have effected a change in the substantive law of
support. In the form in which originally promul-
gated, § 7 purported to give the obligee, at the time
of the filing of.the petition in the initiating state, an
election as to whether to invoke the substantive law
of the initiating state or the substantive law of the
responding state. In effect, if W filed a petition or
complaint in state X for transmittal to state Y
where H had taken refuge, W would be permitted to
elect to proceed either under the substantive law of
state X or that of state Y. However, the 1952
amendments then omitted the phrase "at the
election of "the obligee" together with some other
wording under which an election was permitted.
The intent of the Commissioners was to insure that
the obligee would not be accorded an "absolute
right to choose the applicable law as her interest
might dictate", but rather, that the obligee have
only "the presumptive right to have her own law
applied until it is shown that the obligor was in
another state, in which case the law of that other
state would be applied automatically...." This
aspect of URESA is extensively discussed in
Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognitiot of Support
Duties, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 382 (1954). See text at
note 35, infra.
presently existing remedies within the enacting
state.'
12
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act"3 provides that the action will be
initiated either in the state where the obligee
is present or in the state which has been
furnishing support to an obligee.14 A simpli-
fied petition or complaint15 is filed in the proper
court1 6 of the initiating state either by a private
attorney or by an official designated to repre-
sent persons utilizing the Act.17 The judge in
12 By this it is meant that so long as the obligor
remains within his home state, remedies exisiing
there for the enforcement of support duties within
that state will normally be used. Should the obligor,
however, go beyond the boundaries of the state, the
reciprocal Act would then be available to provide
for enforcement of support duties.
13 Since the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA) is the most widely adopted
of the reciprocal statutes, it will be used to illustrate
the general procedure under this type of legislation.
11 Section 9 of URESA provides for the filing of
the petition. Section 8 provides that if the state, or
a political subdivision thereof, has been providing
support to the obligee, it then has the same right as
the obligee to invoke the machinery of the Act to
obtain reimbursement, or, if need be, continuing
support payments.
1 Section 10 describes the form of the petition.
Basically, the petition (or complaint under some
Acts, the phraseology varying from state as dictated
by the organization of the judiciary) shows the
status of the obligee, the alleged basis for entitle-
ment to support, a copy of the Act of the initiating
-state attached thereto, alleges a failure to support,
the location of the obligor or his property insofar as
is known and prays for an order support "as shall
be deemed to be fair and reasonable." Section 18
requires, in the event the court in the responding
state is unable to proceed due to some deficiency in
the petition, that the responding court shall inform
the initiating court of this fact, proceeding, mean-
while, on its own initiative to trace the obligor -or
his property without dismissing the pending case.
16 Each individual state statute designates the
court which has jurisdiction over proceedings in-
stituted under the Act. § 2(4).
17 Again, the petitioner's representative is des-
ignated in accordance with local conditions. More
often than not he is either the district attorney or
the prosecuting attorney. He -is empowered to act
as the petitioner's representative upon request of the
court or any other designated official or agency. §11.
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the initiating state examines the petition and if
he is reasonably satisfied that a duty of support
is owing, he sends to the designated court of
the responding state: (1) three copies of the
petition; (2) a certificate executed by him
stating that the verified petition has been
examined, that the obligor is believed to be in
the responding state (giving his address), that,
in the opinion of the court, the obligee is
entitled to support in a certain amount as
shown by facts appearing in the petition; and,
(3) a copy of the act in force in the initiating
state.8 Upon receipt of the enumerated docu-
ments, the responding state court dockets the
case, informs the designated official charged
with the duty of representing the petitioner,
sets a time and place for a hearing, and takes
appropriate action to obtain jurisdiction
over the person, or property, of the obligor.19
Should the obligor-defendant refuse to submit
to the jurisdiction of the court in the responding
state, extradition proceedings may be com-
menced; however, if the defendant does submit
to the jurisdiction of the responding court
and complies with its support order, he shall
be relieved of extradition.20
Assuming that the obligor has submitted to
the jurisdiction of the responding court, the
actual trial of the case commences. As a
practical matter the obligor will more often
than not admit the duty of support, contesting
primarily, the amount of support requested.
The proceedings are either at law or in eqlity,
Is §13. At the time of filing of the petition,
whether the court be acting either as the initiating
or responding court, the judge may, in his discre-
tion, waive all costs and fees for either one or both
of the parties. §14. See text at note 61, infra.
19 §17. See note 15, supra, dealing with the further
duty of the responding court in the event that
jurisdiction over the obligor cannot be readily ob-
tained due to deficiencies in the petition or informa-
tion contained therein.
If there is reasoh to believe that the obligor will
flee the jurisdiction, the responding court is em-
powered to obtain jurisdiction over him by ap-
propriate process, e.g., arrest. This action is taken
by the responding court, either at the request of the
initiating court or of its own volition. 4 15.
20 §§5 and 6. See text at note 50, infra.
in accordance with the law of the responding
state" and the rules of evidence in force in the
court of the responding state govern the taking
of evidence, save that the husband-wife
privilege is inapplicable." Since the obligee is
not required to make a personal appearance, all
evidence is cx parie. If the obligor denies any
allegation of the petition, the denial is trans-
mitted back to the initiating state court where
proofs are taken for the obligee, after which a
certified transcript of the proof is transmitted
to the court conducting the hearing. The
obligor is then entitled to introduce evidence
and cross-examine the obligee and her witnesses
by means of deposition, affidavit or oral
examination. This process continues until all
relevant evidence has been introduced, at
which time the court in the responding state
renders a decision and enters an appropriate
order.2 A copy of any support order decreed
by the responding court is then transmitted to
the court in the initiating state." Furthermore,
in the enforcement of its order, the responding
court is vested with normal supervisory
powers, such as requiring the posting of a cash
deposit or recognizance bond, specifying the
time and place of payments and punishing the
obligor for a failure to pay. -" The mechanical
aspects of the actual payments are: (1) pay-
ment by the obligor. pursuant to the order,
to the designated agency (clerk of court, proba-
tion department, welfare agency, etc.); (2)
transmittal to the court of the initiating state;
and (3) receipt in the initiating state by the
designated agency and subsequent disburse-
ment to the obligee."
6
Despite the fact that the URESA has been
in effect in the great majority of states for
more than five years, and its forerunner, the
21 §19. As to whether the proceedings are at law
or in equity, see Warren v. Warren, 204 Md. 467.
105 A.2d 488 (1954).
2" §§25 and 26.
-§20.
24 §21.
2- Such punishment is meted out in accordance
with local laws dealing with contempt of court.
§22
21 §§23 and 24.
[Vol. 46
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
Uniform Support of Dependents Law (USDL),
has been in operation since two. years prior to
that time, there seems to have been a minimum
amount of litigation at the appellate, level.
However, a comparatively recent compilation
of facts and figures dealing with the operation
of the reciprocal acts at the trial level,
discloses .that substantial progress is being
made as .state- officials gradually become more
familiar with the operation of the two state
procedure.? However, of utmost importance
is the fact that as each state adopted one of the
"uniform" acts, more often than not local
ameidmer/i& were introduced prior to passage.
Thus it becomes mandatory practice for the
local petiti6ner's representative to familiarize
himself not only with his own state's statute,
but also with that of the other state.2 This
27 Comment, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act. 3 KAN. L. REv. 44 (1954).
For instance, in 1953, $249,068.12 was collected in
actions commenced in New York City, and, in the
city itself, $224,400.50 was collected pursuant to
actioh commenced in other states. The total of
S473,468.62 compares favorably with a figure of
S219,04A.26 amassed in 1952. Id. at 55. The com-
ment concludes, in effect, that although the con-
sensus of opinion is that the reciprocal legislation is
no panacea to the problem of non-support, it does
provide an inexpensive and practical means for
crossing state lines in pursuit of the wayfaring
father.
8 Local statutes designate the State Information
Agency. §16. If the local statute was passed prior
to the 1952 amendments to the Act as promulgated
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it
may omit this section. If this is the case, then the
name of the State Information Agency is available
upon request from The Council of State Govern-
ments, 1313 East 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois,
which publishes a Manual of Procedure for the use
of local officials, available through State Informa-
tion Agencies. A new Manual is now being pub-
lished and will be completed in the Fall of 195E.
Since it will be primarily an up-dating of the 1953
edition, it can be expected to contain excerpts from
laws of the various states, lists of State Information
Agencies, lists of court and Petitioner's Repre-
sentatives as designated by local acts, sample forms
for petitions, certificates and proofs of testimony,
and other valualle materials. It is supplemented
qualification also applies to this comment,
which deals primarily with the URESA unless
reference is made to specific legislation other
than the URESA.
PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER THE RECIPROCAL
ACTs: RESOLVED AND UNRESOLVED BY
RECENT DEcIsIoNsP
URESA Not a Compact
The United States Supreme Court laid down
the test as to whether or not a given act
constitutes a compact in violation of the Con-
stitution3 as follows: ". . . iT]he formation of
any combination tending to the increase, of
political power in the states [constitutes a
compact]. . .. "31 An examination of any of
the recent acts pertaining to non-support re-
veals the spuriousness of an objection to them
on the ground that they are a compact in
violation of the Constitution. Each state is
free to repeal its act at any time. Initial
passage is not contingent upon, nor pursuant
to, an agreement with another state, nor does
enactment of reciprocal support legislation
increase the political power of the state.
Furthermore, even if it were assumed that the
URESA were impliedly a compact, better
reasoned opinions support the conclusion that
compacts which do not increase or decrease
political power are merely voidable and that
from time to time by mimeographed materials,
including recent decisions throughout the United
States. Again, all these materials are made available
through State Information Agencies and the
Council of State Governments should not be con-
tacted unless the information cannot be obtained at
the state level.
2 In order to facilitate the discussion of the
various objections which have been voiced against
the reciprocal acts, the remaining portion of the
comment will follow, as much as is possible, the
normal course of procedure between two states. For
a detailed discussion of virtually every relevant
case, see Annot. 42 A.L.R.2d 768 (1955).
30 U.S. CoNsT. art. I §3 cl. 10.
31 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1892).
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congress may consent by silence or acquies-
cence.n
Substantially Similar Reciprocal Law
In order to prosecute effectively a petition
for support under the statute in force in the
initiating state, it is necessary that the re-
sponding state possess an act "substantially
similar" to that of the initiating state.n This
requirement has given rise to problems pri-
marily where an interplay between the URESA
and the USDL occurs. If the acts are not
"substantially similar", the obligor is in a
position to contest the jurisdiction of the
responding court under section 17 of the
URESA on the ground that the initiating state
does not possess a "substantially similar"
act. However, courts have been uniformly
liberal in finding that acts of a like nature or
kind, whether couched in identical language
with the local act or not, qualify as reciprocal
laws.3 It would seem that under any of the
statutes presently in force in the several states,
this contention would be without merit. Since
procedures prescribed are nearly identical,
and since the basic intent and purpose of all
the acts is the same, it is doubtful whether
such an argument would be accepted by any
court.
Duty of Support and Choice of Law
Foremost among the questions arising at
this point is whether the petitioner in the
initiating state has a right to the support
32Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d (Ky. 1953);
Landes v. Landes, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 442 (N.Y. Dom.
Rel.Ct. 1955); Bruce, The Compacts and Agree-
ments of the States With One Another and With
Foreign Powers, 2 MIN. L. REv. 500 (1939);
Frankfurter and Landis The Compact Claus, of the
Constitution 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925); Lee, Ala-
bama's Reciprocal Nonsupport Legislation, 2 ALA.
L. REV. 228 (1953).
1 §2(1).
31 Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175
Pa.Super. 100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954); Florence v.
Florence, 136 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y. Children's
Ct. 1955); Hodges v. Hodges, 202 Misc. 71, 108
N.Y.S. 2d 286 (N.Y.Dom.Rel.Ct. 1951); Smith
v. Smith, 281 P. 2d 274 (Cal.App. 1955).
sought. Understandably, this problem, which
may be classified as one of choice of law,
appears to engender the greatest amount of
confusion over the new reciprocal legislation.
Specifically, this is the question of which state
law controls. Is it the law of the initiating
state where the obligee resides, the law of the
responding state where the obligor resides or
the law of some third state where the failure
to support first occurred? Can prior support
decrees be enforced and can they be interposed
as a defense to a proceeding under the Act?
Does it make any difference if the amount is
accrued on the prior decree, or if the decree is
subject to modification? These questions il-
lustrate only a portion of the problems in this
area, most of which are as yet unresolved and
many of which will be answered differently
under each state act because of local modifica-
tions or because different versions of the act
are in force.
Keeping in mind the fact that one of the
basic objectives of the URESA is to ease the
burden on state welfare funds, it is curious to
note that on occasion a public policy of the
forum has been invoked to override this ob-
jective. For example, the New York courts
have taken the position, under their reciprocal
legislation (USDL),35 that whether they are
acting as the initiating 6 or the responding
state they are without jurisdiction to hear the
case unless the petitioner is entitled to support
under the substantive law of New York.3
35 See note 10 supra.
36 Vincenza v. Vincenza, 97 Misc. 1027, 98
N.Y.S. 2d 470 (1950). The court here held that
since the petitioner (obligee) was not entited to
support under the substantive law of New York,
that it was without authority to certify the petition
to the responding state court.
37 Ross v. Ross, 136 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. Children's
Ct. 1954). Basing its decision on the Vincenza
case, the court held that it was without jurisdiction
to issue an order of support acting as the responding
state. See also, Landes v. Landes, 138 N.Y.S.
2d 442 (N.Y. Dom.Rel.Ct. 1955).
38 Although the decision in the lincenza case is
defensible, the position taken by the court in Ross
Ross does not seem to be. The Vincenza case is
distinguishable from the Ross case in that in the
[Vol. 46
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Under the original Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act (URES), the law govern-
ing the duty of support was to be elected by the
obligee, and was defined as being any duty of
support imposable under the law of the state
where the obligee was residing when the failure
to support commenced, without regard to the
law prevailing at the respondent-obligor's
residence or in the responding state. In Com-
nwwealth v. Mong,n however, the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that this provision did
not authorize an obligee to proceed under
the substantive law of another state when
the Ohio court was exercising jurisdiction as the
responding state. 0 In jurisdictions where the
URESA prevails without modification, the
obligor is liable for support under the laws
of the state in which he was present during the
period for which support is sought-whether
the duty of support is presently imposed by
the responding state, or is merely imposable,
former it was New York which had the greatest
interest in having the petitioner-resident obtain
support in order that he might be stricken from the
relief rolls. In the Ross situation it was an out of
state obligee, entitled to support under the laws of
that state (California), who was denied relief.
Under such circumstances the public policy of the
responding forum ought not be permitted to over-
ride the duty of support owing under the law of the
petitoning state where the obligee is residing.
39 160 Ohio St. 455, 117 N.E. 2d 32 (1954).
Notes, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1954); 29 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1480 (1950). See also, Ehrenzweig, supra
note 11, at 387.
40 On its face this decision would seem to be
manifestly incorrect. However, the facts in the case
show that it was the obligee who had left the obligor.
Thus, insofar as the case turned on the public
policy argument advanced by the court, the de-
cision would not seem to be objectionable. But the
direct attack by the court upon the URES does not
seem justified under the circumstances. A close
construction of the clause in effect under the
1950 URES reveals that the duty of support arises
at the time the obligor enters into a state recogniz-
ing a duty of support. On this basis the Mong case
can be justified, since Ohio did not recognize a
duty of support by a son to a deserting parent.
and regardless of how the duty arises.41 Sec-
tion 7, as presently worded, will give relief to
the obligee if the laws of the responding state
recognize a duty of support, or if the laws of
the state in which the obligor was present for
the period for which support is sought impose
such a duty.41a The basic defect is that such a
provision will probably encourage the deserting
obligor to seek a jurisdiction which has support
laws most favorable to him.
Perhaps the best solution to this problem
of choice of law under the reciprocal acts is
that set forth in a recent article.e It is there
submitted, basically, that the rule ought to be
that the law of the state of the obligee's present
domicil control the duty of support, subject to
an exception exercisable in the discretion of
the responding court that the laws of the
initiating (obligee's) state will not be enforced
under the reciprocal act where it is shown that
the dependent moved there solely for the pur-
pose of obtaining the benefit of these laws.4
Delegation of Legislative Power: Abdication of
Judicial Function
Several objections have been raised about
the interrelationship of the courts of two states
41 §2(6). According to the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, the redrafting of §7 was made
in accordance with a recommendation of Dean
Stimson based on his analysis of Commonwealth v.
Acker, 197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312 (1908), which he
interpreted as standing for the proposition that
"the applicable law is the law to which the person
alleged to be under a duty was subject at the sig-
nificant time and not the law to which the person
claiming the right was subject." Stimson, Simpli-
fying the Conflict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for
Enactment by the Congress, 36 A.B.A.J. 1003,
1005 (1950).
41 See Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 24 U.S.L.
Week 2190 (Phila. Mun. Ct. Pa. Oct. 12, 1955).
42 Ehrenzeig, supra. note 11.
4 This recommended approach appears to follow
the basic purposes of the reciprocal laws more closely
than any other. Its weakness would seem to lie in its
failure to take into account a certain tenacity of each
individual state judiciary to cling to local rules
governing the choice of law.
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participating together in the disposition of a
single case in an integrated proceeding. Thus,
in Duncan v. Smith," it was argued that the
URES purported to give Kentucky courts
jurisdiction outside the state, and, conversely,
gave other state courts jurisdiction within the
territorial limits of Kentucky. Or, as was also
argued in the Duncan case, .the objection may
be that the Act is invalid on the ground that
since it has no effect until another legislature
acts, it results, in effect, in the delegation of
legislative power by one state to the legislature
of a second state. This last objection was
convincingly disposed of in the Duncan case.
45
The former requires but little analysis to
expose its speciousness. Even a cursory ex-
amination of the URESA discloses that neither
of the two courts involved is acting by virtue
of judicial power delegated to it by a foreign
legislature; each is acting under the mandate of
its own legislative body.46 That this is true is
14 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
46 The court held, in effect, that a state legislature
may enact a law to take effect when certain con-
ditions arise. Although these conditions may be
created by the legislature of another state, they are
prescribed by the local legislature and if they never
arise the act remains quiescent. Duncan v. Smith,
262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953).
4"The tenor of the argument at this juncture is
that the legislature of one state purports to give
extrateiritorial jurisdiction to the courts of both its
own state and those of a state having substantially
similar reciprocal legislation. Thus, for example, an
obligor would contend that the Act in his state
State A, purports to give the courts in the initiating
state, State B, jurisdiction over him. And that the
Act in State B purports to give its courts extra-
territorial jurisdiction over him even though he is no
longer, or never has been, domiciled in State B.
The answer to such an objection is clear. The
URESA merely provides for the exercise of powers
by the courts of the state in which it is in force. An
initiating court merely acts as an agent of con-
venience for the court of the responding state. It is
the responding court which takes jurisdiction over
the obligor vho is located therein; jurisdiction being
exercised under the provisions of the Act in the
responding state. Furthermore, there is no con-
stitutional requirement that the obligee-petitioner
he physically present in the responding state.
apparent from the fact that the procedure
does not become operative within a jurisdic-
tion until its own legislature has acted.
The most far-reaching complaint that can be
made is that the legislation requires the re-
sponding court to abdicate judicial control
over some of the procedure in a case before it.
But, a deciding court sitting in the responding
state with the obligor-defendant before it has
the power to decide and dispose of the case
and has not abdicated that power. It might be
argued that since the evidence-taking body
(in this case the initiating court hearing
evidence proffered by the obligee) does not
serve as an extended arm of the deciding court,
any decision based on the evidence adduced
before the initiating court is not being taken
subject to the laws of the state in which the
responding court is sitting. This distinction
appears to be one of form rather than sub-
stance, since the taking of evidence in a foreign
court finds sanction in the time-honored prac-
tice of letters rogatory. Here, the law and
process utilized is that of the foreign jurisdic-
tion which honors the letters rogatory.0
Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.3d 373 (Ky. 1953).
Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 270 P.2d
613 (1954); Whittlesey v. Bellah, 278 P.2d 511
(Cal.App. 1955).
47 Letters rogatory are issued to a foreign court,
asking it to compel a desired witness to appear
before it and give testimony necessary for the
complete administration of justice in a cause to be
decided by the requesting forum. The Signe. 37
F.Supp. 819 (E.D.La. 1941). The law and process
used is that of the foreign jurisdiction which honors
the letters rogatory. Note, Reciprocity for Letters
Rogatory Under the Judicial Code, 58 YALE L.J.
1193 (1949). The power of courts to issue, and to
honor and execute letters rogatory, is recognized
by overwhelming authority as an inherently proper
judicial activity. Annots. 9 A.L.R. 966 (1920),
108 A.L.R. 384 (1937). The analogy afforded by
reference to the use of letters rogatory not only
demonstrates that utilization of a foreign court does
not constitute an invalid delegation or abdication
of judicial function, but also serves to demonstrate
that there is nothing inherently offensive in allowing
the courts of two sovereigns to participate in the
disposition of a single case.
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Yet, as -to the initiating court, which has
received the peitition and evidence accompany-
ing it and foiwarded these on to the responding
court for decision, it might still be contended
that there has been an undegirabld abdication
of its judicial power to decide a case brought
before it. In the majority of cases this will not
be true since the initiating court lacks juris-
diction over the obligor-defendant in the first
instance. In cases in which jurisdiction over the
person of the obligor could have been obtained
under concepts of domicil and substituted
service, the Act establishes an alternate
remedy and expressly reserves existing remedies
if resort to them is deemed preferable.49 No
constraint requiring abdication of judicial
function is created by giving the obligee the
choice of a new remedial procedure.
Criminal Enforccment via Extradition
Criminal enforcement provisions included in
the URESA are designed to stimulate volun-
tary submission to the civil enforcement
procedures of the Act.50 Section 5, which consti-
tutes a slight departure from the Uniform Crim-
inal Extradition Act,0' provides for the extra-
dition of a person for the crime of non-support,
notwithstanding the fact that he was not
present in the demanding state at the time of
the commission of the crime charged. The con-
stitutionality of this provision has been dis-
cussed at length, both in relation to the civil
enforcement sections of the Act and to its
departure from prior statutory rules governing
extradition, 2 and has been upheld in a num-
ber of state decisions.n More difficult questions
18 See note 2 supra.
'9 §3.
10 9A U.L-. 63 (Supp. 1954).
st 9 U.L.A'. 192 §6. As to the constitutionality of
this section, see, Ex parte Morgan, 78 F.Supp.
756 (S.D.Ca!. 1948).
52 Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal En-
torcement of Support Act Constitutionall 31 ORE.
L. Rav. 97 (1052); Tasker, Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Law Like Reciprocal En-
forcemnent of Support Law, 1 So. TEXAs L.J. 144
(1954); Lee. supra note 31, at 246.
m Ex parle Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820
(1954); Harrison v. State, 77 S.2d 384 (Ala. App.
are encountered, however, in an examination
of its companion section (§6). This section
purports to relieve an obligor from extradition
upon his submission to the jurisdiction of the
court of the responding state. As uniformly con-
strued, the section contemplates that a civil
proceeding will have been commenced in the
initiating state before the obligor can submit
to the jurisdiction of the responding court and
request that an order of support be entered.
The anomaly created by this situation, which
permits extradition under the Act in lieu of
civil enforcement, is that the practical results
sought to be achieved will be frustrated in
cases either where the initiating state has not
enacted the section or whether the obligee is
motivated by a feeling of vindictiveness and
refuses to file a petition for support. It is
submitted that the Minnesota Act,55 in effect
permitting extradition only upon a failure of
the obligor to pay, is the solution to this
dilemma and ought to be adopted as a standard.
Due Process: Equal Protection: Privileges and
Immunities
Any judgment rendered under the URESA is
based upon actual notice and personal juris-
diction. There is a fair hearing, and, as has
been demonstrated, no denial of due process of
law results by the taking of ex parte evidence in
the initiating court for use in the responding
1954); Ex parte Susman, 116 Cal. App. 2d 798,
254 P.2d 161 (1953). See also, 23 Ops CAL. AT-'Y
GEN. 33 (19.54); OsS. OHIO ATT'Y GEN. 408 (1953).
"Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal. App. 2d 379, 273
P.2d 820 (1954); 23 OPs. CAL. AT'T'. GFN. 33
(1954); Ops. Onto ATr'Y. GEN. 408 (1953). See
also, NAT'L. Assoc. or ATTY's. GEN., CONFEVENCE
PROCEEDINGS 140, (1953).
15 "Subd. 4, SURRENDER. The governor of this
state shall neither demand nor grant the surrender of
an obligor subject to this section who submits to the
jurisdiction of the court of a responding state
(1) so long as the obligor complies with an
order of that court for support, or
(2) in the absence of an order for support,
while a proceeding for support is pending
in that court." MiN. STAT. §§518.41-
518 (1953).
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court.-6 The determination by the initiating
court, that the facts in the petition show a
duty of support, does not bind the responding
court; the obligor is free to controvert any
facts alleged in the petition.Y Moreover, there
is no denial of due process of law by reason of
either an alleged withdrawl of the right to
cross-examination or confrontration. Cross-
examination is provided by an exercise of the
court's inherent power to provide appropriate
procedures for the performance of its judicial
functions; testimony is taken either by affidavit,
deposition or oral examination.-8 There is no
guarantee of confrontation in a civil proceed-
ing,- nor does the due process clause guarantee
any particular form of procedure in a civil
action before a state court.60
The argument that the URESA denies the
obligor equal protection of the laws by allowing
waiver of costs and fees,61 either in the initiating
or responding court, has been rejected a number
of times.Y The contention that the Act violates
56 One recent opinion may have gone further than
intended. In Whittlesey v. Bellah, 278 P.2d 511
(Cal.App. 1955) it was stated that ".... the courts
of this state do. not abdicate any of their judicial
power in deciding this sort of a proceeding.
"Therefore, the amount of support money re-
quired... is entirely at large in this state. We are
not bound by the recommendation of the New York
court, or by the proof for the minor presented in that
court." Id. at 513. (emphasis added).
57 Brockelbank, supra note 49 at 108.
58 Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154,270 P.613,
623 (1954). Lee, supra note 31, at 244.
59 Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal. App.2d 154, 270
P.2d 613 (1954); Freeman v. Freeman, 266 La.410,
76 S.2d 414 (1954). As to the issue of whether a
proceeding under URESA is legal or equitable and
whether or not there is a right to a jury trial in the
responding court, see, Warren v. Warren, 204
Md. 467, 105 A.2d 488 (1954).
60 Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 270
P.2d 613 (1954).
61 §14. See Lee supra note 31, at 239. Approxi-
mately 42 jurisdictions now permit the waiver of
fees in the responding court.
62 Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1954);
Smith v. Smith, 125 Cal.App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d
613 (1954); Landes v. Landes, 138 N.Y.S.2d 442
(N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1955). The argument is to the
the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution has likewise received short
shrift . 3 An additional objection to the Act on
the ground that it is a quasi-criminal statute"
without the attendant safeguards has been
rejected on the basis that the power to punish
for a failure to comply with the order of the
court is vested in every court in order to
facilitate enforcement of its decrees and or-
ders.65
CONCLUSION
To look upon the Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act as merely one more
attempt to meet the legal problems of family
desertion is to interpret its significance too
narrowly. In a broader sense, it is a visionary
effort to solve the problems of multiple state
sovereignties in a highly mobilized society
where the general doctrines of personal juris-
diction, full faith and credit and comity have
failed to give practical effect to legal rights.
Wherever these problems arise the reciprocal
machinery herein described offers a hopeful
solution. The new Act extends an effective
remedy to deserted dependents who have in
the past remained hopelessly mired in a morass
of inadequate legal remedies. It also lends
encouragement to harrassed state welfare
officials who face a growing list of dependent
children and a growing public impatience
toward snowballing tax loads.
Dedicated, as we are, to preserving the
system of multiple sovereignties with its
effect that by permitting the obligee to proceed
without paying a fee while requiring the obligor to
do so, constitutes a denial of equal protection of
the laws. The answer, given in Smith v. Smith,
supra, is that the Act indulges in a reasonable and
unarbitrary classification of parties under which all
persons similarly situated are treated alike.
1 Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1954).
6-1 The argument is to the effect that inasmuch as
the Act permits punishmeni in the nature of criminal
punishment for a failure to comply with a respond-
ing court's order of support it constitutes a criminal
statute.
65 Freeman v. Freeman, 266 La. 410 76 S.2d
414 (1954): Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373
(Ky. 1954).
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